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Abstract
It is well understood that political participation is stratiﬁed by socio-economic
characteristics. Yet it is an open question how this ﬁnding bears on the normative
evaluation of the democratic process. In this paper we argue that the equality of op-
portunity (EOp) concept furnishes an attractive framework to answer this question.
Drawing on the analytical tools developed by an expanding empirical literature on EOp
we investigate to what extent political participation is determined by factors that lie
beyond individual control (circumstances) and thus is unfairly distributed. Using rich
panel data from the US, we ﬁnd that a lack of political opportunity is particularly
pronounced for contacts with oﬃcials, participation in rallies and marches, and mem-
bership in political organizations. These opportunity shortages tend to complement
each other across activities and persist over time. While family characteristics and
psychological dispositions during childhood emanate as the strongest determinants,
genetic variation is a small yet signiﬁcant contributor to unequal political opportuni-
ties in the US.
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1 Introduction
Rousseau (1978) supposed that in well-run states everyone rushes to the assemblies.
Judging by that standard Western democracies are in increasingly bad shape as the drop
in voter participation is a shared tendency in these countries (OECD, 2015). The lack
in political participation and the underlying stratiﬁcation has been researched extensively
by scholars of political sociology, who ﬁnd that participation varies positively with socio-
economic status (SES). The SES framework purports that people with lower socio-economic
status, as embodied in income and education, dispose of fewer resources to cover the cost
of political participation. The importance of SES varies across political activities due to
the diﬀerent nature and amounts of the inputs required (Bénabou, 2000). For instance,
formulating a petition to a local representative arguably requires a more comprehensive
skill-set than joining a protest march. Campaign contributions require ﬁnancial leeway
and are highly skewed in favor of the upper percentiles of the income distribution. In
general, however, the link between education, ﬁnancial capacity and political participation,
as emanating from research in political sociology is stable and likewise accepted among
scholars of economics (Bourguignon and Verdier, 2000; Campante, 2011; Milligan et al.,
2004).
In spite of the breadth of research undertaken to discern the determinants of political
participation, one is tempted to ask how these ﬁndings bear on the normative evaluation of
democratic outcomes. Verba et al. (1993) suggest that a verdict on the legitimacy of demo-
cratic outcomes depends on the extent to which political inactivity is self-inﬂicted instead
of being attributable to factors beyond individual control. In later writings these authors
formulate this requirement more explicitly by highlighting the importance of equity in the
conditions or opportunities aﬀorded to a player [in the political game] (Verba, 2006). Yet
in spite of the wide appreciation of the normative importance of political opportunities,
no rigorous empirical investigation has been forthcoming to this date (Brady et al., 2015).
In this paper we estimate equality of opportunity (EOp, or IOp for inequality of op-
portunity) in political participation in the United States. To be sure, we are interested
in eﬀective opportunities as opposed to merely formal opportunities. In the US the right
to vote is unrestricted  as is the right to free speech and association. What we address
in this work is the extent to which diﬀerences in the capacity to negotiate these formal
opportunities are due to factors beyond individual control. We focus on the following
seven forms of participation: (i) vote registration for the 2000 Presidential election, (ii)
vote casting in the 2000 Presidential election, (iii) contact to oﬃcials, (iv) participation
in rallies or marches, (v) membership in political organizations, (vi) volunteering in civic
organizations, and lastly (vii) the vote frequency in statewide and local elections. Thereby
we speak to two distinct branches of existing literature.
First, we widen the scope of the existing (economic) literature on EOp by considering
a new outcome dimension, namely political participation. Research to date has focused
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on income (Björklund et al., 2012; Ferreira and Gignoux, 2011; Pistolesi, 2009), education
(Brunori et al., 2012) or health outcomes (Fleurbaey and Schokkaert, 2009; Rosa Dias,
2009). Furthermore, to the best of our knowledge this is the ﬁrst work that expands the
set of circumstance variables by genotype information. By virtue of the fact that genes
are ﬁxed, they represent the purest measure of biological inheritance (Fowler et al., 2008)
and thus should be of particular interest in the estimation of EOp.
Second, the determinants of political participation are vastly researched in the ﬁeld of
political sociology (for comprehensive overviews: Barrett and Brunton-Smith, 2014; Verba
et al., 2012). In addition to indicators of SES the literature has considered a host of diﬀerent
variables that are of interest from an equal-opportunity perspective. One group of works
has focused on immutable personal characteristics such as race (Verba et al., 1993), sex
(Schlozman et al., 1995), age and cohort (Blais et al., 2004). Another group has considered
inﬂuence factors that are not strictly immutable but play out before the age of consent,
such as parental political participation (Niemi and Jennings, M. Kent, 1991; Plutzer, 2002),
local networks in the area of upbringing (Gimpel et al., 2006), or voluntary participation in
youth organizations (McFarland and Thomas, 2006). All these factors have been analyzed
in their own right but have not been used to construct a comprehensive measure of IOp 
a gap that will be addressed in this paper.
Our results suggest signiﬁcant IOp along each considered dimension of political partici-
pation, especially with respect to contacts to oﬃcials, participation in rallies and marches,
and the membership in political organizations. In all of the aforementioned dimensions
we calculate type-speciﬁc dissimilarity indexes of more than 50%. It is noteworthy that
opportunity disadvantages do not set-oﬀ each other across diﬀerent dimensions. Disadvan-
tages in either activity are positively correlated with opportunity disadvantages in other
forms of political participation. Furthermore, our results suggest that opportunity disad-
vantages persist over time. Family circumstances and psychological dispositions as a child
consistently exert the strongest inﬂuence on unequal opportunities across all forms of po-
litical participation. We ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant inﬂuence of genetic information on
IOp, which however is small in magnitude in comparison with the previously mentioned
circumstance groups.
In the following section we outline the conceptual framework as well as the associated
estimation strategy. In section 3 we describe the data set, followed by the presentation of
the results in section 4. Lastly, we conclude with section 5.
2 Conceptual Framework
EOp is a framework for the normative assessment of the distribution of some desirable
outcome p, such as health status, education or income. It is rooted in a philosophical
discourse on the principles of distributive justice. The underlying normative cut  that
people should be held responsible for their choices only, not for factors beyond their con-
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trol  resonates in the most prominent contributions to this branch of the philosophical
discourse (Arneson, 1989; Cohen, 1989; Dworkin, 1981; Rawls, 1971; Sen, 1979). On the
one hand, the normative principle implies that inequality is unacceptable if it is rooted
beyond the sphere of individual control. It is the task of social policy to correct the out-
come distribution, for instance by means of transfer payments in the case of income. On
the other hand, equality of outcomes is not a demand of justice as long as we reject the
idea that the human endeavor is perfectly deterministic. To the extent that inequality is
a result of individual eﬀort, proponents of EOp accept the outcome distribution as fair.
The formalization of the EOp principles by Roemer (1998) has stimulated an extensive
body of literature in the ﬁeld of economics (see Ferreira and Peragine, 2015; Roemer
and Trannoy, 2015, for recent overviews). Particularly the normative and econometric
properties of diﬀerent measurement approaches have been an area of in-depth interest
(Van de gaer and Ramos, 2016).
The Normative Status of Political Participation It is beyond the ambit of this work
to put forward a comprehensive account of the normative status of political participation.
Yet we want to sketch why political participation is a desirable outcome that warrants the
quest for equal opportunity.
Rousseau (1978) considers three attributes that make political participation inherently
desirable (for a discussion see Pateman, 1970, ch.2). First, it fosters civic education in
the sense that a political act always involves some strategic reasoning that requires the
actor to put herself in the shoes of her fellow citizens. Second, political participation
entails freedom understood as being one's own master. Exercising one's say in the process
of elaborating policies, the laws to which one is subjected are self-prescribed rather than
externally imposed. Lastly, according to Rousseau political participation fosters a sense of
belonging within a community. These notions indicate some inherent value in the act of
participation as such.
Moreover, by means of participating in the political process the constituents of a ju-
risdiction can inﬂuence policies, the consequences of which are fed back to themselves.
Thus political participation also has an instrumental function in protecting the citizen's
(private) interests. An illustrative example is furnished by the debate on why the seminal
Meltzer and Richard (1981) model for redistribution fails to garner empirical support. One
prime contender among other explanations is the assertion that the distribution of political
inﬂuence is biased in the direction of the income distribution (among others Karabarbou-
nis, 2011). That alone would be unproblematic if the preferences of the participating
population were entirely congruent with the abstaining fraction. However this assumption
seems to be contradicted by the ﬁnding that [i]n particular, women, youth and African-
Americans appear to have stronger preferences for redistribution (Alesina and Giuliano,
2011). Henceforth, if political activity was stratiﬁed by these circumstance characteris-
tics, the participation bias would re-enforce existing inequalities by discounting the call for
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increased redistribution.
Analytical Approach In line with the underlying normative principle, we decompose
the observed outcome distribution F (p) into a fair and an unfair component. From an
EOp perspective, F (p) would be fair if it was entirely determined by factors that lie within
the realm of control of individuals i. To operationalize this idea, the empirical literature
draws on the concepts of circumstances and eﬀorts  the underlying assumption being that
a set of circumstances Ω and a set of eﬀorts Θ jointly determine the outcome of interest p.
Standard examples of circumstances are the biological sex, skin color or the educational
achievement of parents. Examples of eﬀort in the context of political participation are
common indicators for socio-economic status such as educational achievement and income,
or individual behaviors that are targeted towards information gathering, such as news
consumption. The relation between these components can be described by a function
g : Θ× Ω 7→ R+.
It is reasonable to assume that the distribution of eﬀorts is not orthogonal to circum-
stances. For example, on the one hand the gender wage gap is the result of discriminatory
processes in the labor market. On the other hand, it has been shown that females have
increased their labor supply in response to a shrinking gender wage gap (Mulligan and Ru-
binstein, 2008). To phrase it in the terms of EOp: females adjusted their eﬀort in response
to reduced discrimination based on the circumstance variable gender. To the extent that
we want to correct for eﬀorts that are endogenous to circumstances, the relation of interest
can be expressed in the following reduced form:
p = g(Ω,Θ(Ω), ), (1)
where circumstances Ω and endogenous eﬀort Θ(Ω) are considered as root-causes of unfair
inequality, whereas diﬀerential eﬀort net of circumstance inﬂuence  yields the fair share
of inequality.
To operationalize this idea econometrically we rely on a method of measurement which
the literature refers to as the ex-ante approach.1 Based on the number of realizations xj
of each circumstance Cj ∈ Ω we can partition the population into a set of types T , where
the number of types is given by K =
∏J
j=1 xj . Assume that there were only two relevant
circumstance variables, say biological sex (C1={Male; Female}) and family background
(C2={Rich; Poor}) with two realizations each. Since x1 = x2 = 2 we can decompose the
population into K = 4 types (Table 1).
Perfect EOp would prevail if all types T k ∈ T faced the same opportunity set and
the observed variation in outcomes was a pure result of diﬀerential eﬀort. As we can
only observe realized individual choices instead of the underlying opportunity space, we
use the type-speciﬁc mean realization of the outcome of interest µk(p) as an estimator of
1It is ex-ante in the sense that the need for compensation is determined without regard to the realization
of individual eﬀort. See Van de gaer and Ramos (2016) for more details.
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Table 1: Example of Type Set
Male Female
Rich Type 1 Type 2
Poor Type 3 Type 4
the respective opportunity set. Drawing on the previous type decomposition, we would
conclude that Type 1 faced a larger opportunity set for voting than Type 2, if the average
turnout of the former group exceeded the average turnout of the latter.
Following this logic, we ﬁt a logit model with circumstances Cji as the only right-hand
side variables. Note that we use a logit model in our main speciﬁcations as activities of
political participation are measured in binary variables (see section 3):2
ln
( pi
1− pi
)
=
J∑
j=1
βjC
j
i . (2)
Recall that the observed outcome pi is determined by the function g(Ωi,Θi(Ωi), i), where
i represents residual eﬀort net of circumstance inﬂuence. Then, by calculating predicted
probabilities based on equation 2, we eﬀectively sterilize the outcome distribution from the
fair inequality component . This yields the estimator for the type-speciﬁc opportunity set
µk(p), since Cji = C
j
h ∀ i, h ∈ T k:
µk(p) =
exp(
∑J
j=1 βˆjC
j
i )
1 + exp(
∑J
j=1 βˆjC
j
i )
. (3)
The resulting distribution of µk(p) is called smoothed distribution, here denoted as Φ.
Note that any inequality in Φ exclusively relates to diﬀerences in circumstances and thus
conﬂicts with the ethics of EOp: the higher the dispersion in Φ, the more variation in F (p)
is explained by circumstances, the higher IOp in political participation.
Equations (2) and (3) illustrate that this procedure yields a lower bound of IOp in
political participation. Variation explained by circumstance variables that are not included
in the estimation, is captured in the error term  and therefore attributed to the fair share
of inequality. Thus, expanding the circumstance set under consideration always increases
the variation in the smoothed distribution Φ unless these circumstances are orthogonal
to the outcome of interest (see Ferreira and Gignoux, 2011; Niehues and Peichl, 2014,
for thorough discussions). As it is very unlikely that any data set captures all relevant
circumstance variables, the outlined estimator of IOp cannot exceed its true value.
To obtain a scalar measure of IOp we subject Φ to two inequality metrics. First, we
calculate the Gini index which is a default measure in many works on inequality. Second,
we construct a dissimilarity index which is applied in various works on EOp with discrete
2The results are robust towards using logit, probit or linear probability estimations. See section 4.
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outcomes (Foguel and Veloso, 2014; Paes de Barros et al., 2008). The dissimilarity index,
based on which we will present most of our results, is constructed as follows. In a ﬁrst step
we calculate the dispersion in opportunities:
T =
1
2N
∑
i
∣∣∣µk(p)− 1
N
∑
i
µki (p)
∣∣∣. (4)
The term within the absolute value brackets indicates by how much a type-speciﬁc advan-
tage level diverges from the average realization within the sample. Note that the second
term within the brackets corresponds to the mean of both F (p) and Φ as the error terms in
a logit estimation sum up to zero. The division by two is for interpretive purposes. As the
sum of positive divergences from the average cancels with sum of negative divergences, T
can now be interpreted as the number of opportunities that would have to be redistributed
in order to obtain the fair outcome. In a second step we scale the dispersion measure by
the average realization within the sample to obtain the dissimilarity index:
D =
T
1
N
∑
i µ
k
i (p)
=
T
µ
(5)
We can interpret D as the share of opportunities that is unfairly distributed.
3 Data
The data set for this research endeavor needs to satisfy two conditions. First, given the
lower bound nature of the IOp estimator it needs to provide a large set of circumstance
variables in order to cushion the downward bias of our results. Second, it needs to include
indicator variables for political participation.3 The one study that strikes a balance be-
tween both requirements is the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent to Adult Health
(Add Health). Add Health is a four-wave panel study that focuses on health-related be-
haviors and the causes of health outcomes. Initial information was collected in 1994/95
on adolescents in grades 7-12 (N = 20, 745) drawing on a stratiﬁed sample of 80 High
Schools in the US. In addition to in-depth interviews with adolescents, questionnaires were
administered to school representatives, parents and roughly 90,000 students of the sampled
schools. Importantly, the survey data is linked to additional contextual data from other
data sources such as the Census of Population and Housing, the School District Databook
or the Statistics of the US Bureau of the State Government Finances. In the two most re-
cent waves all respondents observed in Wave 1 (N = 15, 170 and N = 15, 701, respectively)
had achieved the age of consent, which makes it feasible to extract outcome variables on
diﬀerent political activities, such as vote casting.
3In the US context surveys with an explicit focus on political behavior, such as the American National
Election Study (ANES) perform poorly with respect to the ﬁrst requirement. The reverse holds true for
longitudinal studies which allow the construction of ﬁnely grained type partitions, such as the National
Longitudinal Study of Youth (NLSY79) and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
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Before proceeding with a description of the variables of interest, we want to give an ac-
count of our understanding of political participation for the purpose of this work. Barrett
and Brunton-Smith (2014) describe political participation as including all activities inﬂu-
encing the development and implementation of public policy and the selection of represen-
tatives entrusted with this process. According to this view participation can be contrasted
to engagement to the extent that the former refers to activities rather than to psychological
dispositions, attitudes and interests. Thus, self-identiﬁed interest in politics or ideologi-
cal leanings are beyond the realm of participation. Moreover, political participation can
be contrasted to civic participation, where the latter relates to voluntary activity to the
beneﬁt of fellow human beings or the public good. Thus, community services, donations
to and fundraising activities for charities are beyond the realm of the political. In practice,
however, there is a ﬁne line between civic and political participation as evidenced by the
fact that non-political organizations, such as religious communities, often serve as recruit-
ment vehicles for political action (Verba et al., 1993). This leads us to abstract from this
second division.
According to this delineation Add Health provides information on the following forms
of political participation: (i) vote registration for the 2000 Presidential election, (ii) vote
casting in the 2000 Presidential election, (iii) contact to oﬃcials, (iv) participation in rallies
or marches, (v) membership in political organizations (vi), volunteering in civic organiza-
tions, and lastly (vii) the vote frequency in statewide and local elections. Information
on activities (i)-(vi) is sourced from Wave 3 (respondent age: 18-26) and captured in bi-
nary variables indicating whether the respective activity was undertaken within the last
12 months. Information on activity (vii) is sourced from Wave 4 (respondent age: 24-32)
and captured in a self-reported, ordinal variable with four expressions, ranging from al-
ways and often to sometimes and never. For the purpose of this work we decompose
this variable into two binary variables indicating whether people consider themselves to
be always-voter or never-voter. In addition we estimate IOp in income acquisition in
order to obtain a sense of the relative magnitude of IOp in political participation. Table 2
provides summary statistics for the outcome variables.
Table 2: Outcome Variables (Summary Statistics)
N Mean Mean
(Weighted)
SD SD
(Weighted)
Min Max
Wave 3 (2001/02)
Personal Income (k$) 13273 13.597 13.394 16.367 15.477 0.000 500.909
Registered (2000) 14087 0.719 0.710 0.450 0.454 0.000 1.000
Vote (2000) 13991 0.439 0.419 0.496 0.493 0.000 1.000
Contact Oﬃcial 14129 0.026 0.028 0.160 0.164 0.000 1.000
Rally/March 14129 0.034 0.032 0.182 0.177 0.000 1.000
Political Org. 14099 0.022 0.021 0.147 0.142 0.000 1.000
Volunteer Work 14099 0.285 0.279 0.451 0.449 0.000 1.000
Wave 4 (2008)
Personal Income (k$) 14314 34.745 34.146 44.826 43.988 0.000 999.995
Vote Always 14549 0.247 0.232 0.431 0.422 0.000 1.000
Vote Never 14549 0.325 0.348 0.468 0.476 0.000 1.000
Note: In the weighted columns summary statistics are corrected for sampling procedure and sample attrition until Wave
3 and 4, respectively.
Circumstance variables are derived from the ﬁrst wave of Add Health, when the vast
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majority of respondents was younger than 18 years of age. We exclude all respondents older
than 17 in the ﬁrst wave.4 This restriction is not innocuous. All applied researchers on EOp
need to decide which individual characteristics they are willing to treat as circumstances.
For the purpose of this work we treat the entire child biography up to the age of 18 as a
circumstance and thus do not hold children responsible for any of their prior choices.5
The circumstances we consider are grouped in m = 11 categories, i.e. Ω =
∑
m Ω
m.
The ﬁrst set includes demographic information such as age, migration status and race.
Second, we consider family background information, for instance the education of parents,
the number of siblings and the self-perceived quality of the child-parent relationship. Third,
we take account of variables that are indicative for the quality of the respondent's social
life as a child. Fourth, the childhood neighborhood is evaluated among others in terms
of its safeness and a host of diﬀerent demographic and socio-economic indicators. The
ﬁfth set captures characteristics of the school the respondent went to. Among others we
take account of the average class size and the educational achievement of teachers. Sixth,
the ability of respondents is evaluated in terms of the standardized Picture Vocabulary
Test Score (PVT) and whether the respondent skipped or repeated any grades. Aspects
of religiosity  captured in the seventh group  are represented by the parent's frequency
of attending service and the self-rated importance of religion. Eighth, the respondent's
physical condition during childhood is evaluated along various dimensions ranging from
physical restrictions due to disabilities, over ratings of attractiveness, to a measure for
the Body Mass Index (BMI). Ninth, we integrate a battery of questions on psychological
dispositions such as suicidal intentions, self-ratings of intelligence and expectations for
one's later life. In group ten we take account of risk behaviors including drug and alcohol
abuse of both the respondent and her friends during childhood. Lastly, we include a
battery of binary indicators for the respondent's genetic endowment. The evolving interest
in genes as mediators of environmental inﬂuences that determine political participation
is a noteworthy recent development in the political science literature (Alford et al., 2005;
Benjamin et al., 2012; Fowler et al., 2008; Fowler and Dawes, 2008). The genetic data used
in this work was sourced in the fourth wave of Add Health for a sample of approximately
15,000 respondents.6 In view of the breadth of circumstances considered, a thorough
description of each circumstance variable cannot be given here. The interested reader is
relegated to Table 10 in the Appendix, where summary statistics on all circumstances are
disclosed.
The analysis is conducted using the provided set of sampling weights in order to cor-
rect for the sampling procedure and sample attrition across waves. Hence our analysis is
nationally representative for adolescents enrolled in grades 7-12 in 1994/95.
4Due to this restriction, the age range in our sample decreases from 18-26 (24-32) to 18-24 (24-30) for
Wave 3 (Wave 4) outcome variables.
5In principle it is possible to specify the responsibility cut-oﬀ at an earlier age, say 12 or 16, which
would restrict the eligible set of circumstances Ω. See Hufe et al. (2015) for a discussion.
6For a more detailed discussion of the genetic variables see section 4.3.
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4 Results
Table 3 lists the main results. While the following discussion is exclusively based on results
from the logit estimates, Table 3 also includes results from linear probability and probit
models, in order to demonstrate the robustness of our results to diﬀerent distributional
assumptions.
Table 3: Results Overview
Outcome N Ø Estimator Diss. Index Gini
Registered (2000) 8142 72.2% Logit 9.5% 0.131
Probit 9.5% 0.130
OLS 9.2% 0.130
Vote (2000) 8111 42.2% Logit 19.8% 0.270
Probit 19.6% 0.269
OLS 18.9% 0.265
Contact Oﬃcial 8170 2.8% Logit 59.7% 0.757
Probit 59.8% 0.756
OLS 58.1% 0.826
Rally/March 8170 3.0% Logit 55.4% 0.713
Probit 55.1% 0.709
OLS 54.1% 0.763
Political Organization 8147 2.1% Logit 63.0% 0.790
Probit 62.6% 0.783
OLS 61.5% 0.877
Volunteer Work 8147 28.7% Logit 24.0% 0.328
Probit 23.8% 0.327
OLS 23.1% 0.325
Vote Always 8145 23.1% Logit 22.4% 0.311
Probit 22.6% 0.314
OLS 21.8% 0.309
Vote Never 8145 33.6% Logit 24.5% 0.333
Probit 24.4% 0.333
OLS 23.5% 0.330
Note: Results are based on all available circumstances. Ø corresponds to the sample average
participation rate with respect to the activity of interest. The last two columns yield two
diﬀerent measures of IOP, the dissimilarity index and the Gini-coeﬃcient in type-speciﬁc
propensities to participate in the activity of interest.
4.1 EOp in Political Participation
Figure 1 illustrates opportunity dispersion for vote casting in the 2000 Presidential elec-
tions. The y-axis shows participation propensities in percent. Types are arranged in order
of increasing advantage along the horizontal axis. At the 0 percentile we have the most
disadvantaged type, deﬁned as the type with the lowest mean participation rate in the 2000
Presidential election. At the 100th percentile we have the most advantaged type, deﬁned
analogously. The gray lines show the smoothed distribution Φ associated with the use of
diﬀerent circumstance sets. The lighter the shade of gray the larger the circumstance set
under consideration. Lastly, the red line indicates the mean participation rate within the
entire sample.
In total 42.2% of the respondents stated to have turned out at the polls, which at
ﬁrst glance appears to be a very high estimate of turnout within the age group 18-24.
For instance, based on CPS data the US Census Bureau (Jamieson et al., 2002) estimates
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Figure 1: Type-Speciﬁc Opportunity Sets for Voting in the 2000 Presidential Election
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Note: All estimates are based on the logit estimator. The following circumstance sets are introduced
sequentially: First (Demographics), Second (Family), Third (Social Life), Fourth (Neighborhood), Fifth
(School), Sixth (Ability), Seventh (Religion), Eighth (Physical Condition), Ninth (Psychological Condition),
Tenth (Risk Behavior), Eleventh (Genetic Endowment). The maroon line yields the mean participation rate
with respect to the activity of interest. At the 100th percentile we have the probability of participation
for the most advantaged type, at the 0 percentile the equivalent for the most disadvantaged type.
a turnout rate of 36.1% for the same age group.7 The gray lines show the mean par-
ticipation level for each type according to various circumstance sets. The darkest line
considers demographic information only. Here, the most advantaged type at the 100th
percentile participated with a probability of slightly more than 59%. At the other end of
the spectrum, the most disadvantaged type turned out with a probability of less than 16%.
These diﬀerences are reinforced as we sequentially introduce the remaining circumstance
categories: family, social life, neighborhood, school, ability, religion, physical condition,
psychological condition, risk behavior, and genetic endowment. Accounting for the full
set of circumstances the probabilities approach 99% and 1% for the most extreme types,
respectively. Figure 1 highlights the fact that our measurement approach delivers a lower
bound of IOp: the dispersion in type-speciﬁc participation propensities grows larger with
the introduction of each additional circumstance set. In terms of the dissimilarity index,
IOp attains a value of 19.8% with the most extensive circumstance set (see Table 3 for an
overview of all scalar measure results).
Figure 2 documents that IOp varies strongly over the diﬀerent forms of political partici-
pation. Among the activities under consideration vote registration is most fairly distributed
from an EOp perspective. Only the lowest percentiles of the smoothed distribution fall
7To some extent this diﬀerence is driven by coding diﬀerences. In the CPS refusals and non-responses
are coded as non-voters (Hur and Achen, 2013), while we exclude them from the analysis. However, even
when redeﬁning the voting variable to match the CPS deﬁnition, average turnout in our sample amounts
to 41.9%. Taken together these facts suggest that misreporting due to desirability bias (Ansolabehere and
Hersh, 2012) is relevant in our sample.
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Figure 2: Comparison of Type-Speciﬁc Opportunity Sets
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Note: All estimates are based on the logit estimator. The maroon line yields the mean participation rate with
respect to the activity of interest. At the 100th percentile we have the probability of participation for the most
advantaged type, at the 0 percentile the equivalent for the most disadvantaged type. Results are based on all
available circumstances.
short in opportunities in comparison with the remaining types. The associated dissimilar-
ity index attains a value of 9.5% (Table 3). The reverse holds true for contacts to oﬃcials,
participation in rallies and marches, and the membership in political organizations. Here
only the most advantaged types engage politically, whereas the vast majority of types have
a very low propensity to participate in these activities. This is reﬂected in dissimilarity
indexes of more than 50% for these activities (see Table 3). Vote casting and voluntary en-
gagement in civic organizations take a middle ground between both extremes, with 19.8%
and 24.0% respectively.
For the purpose of obtaining a better understanding of the relative magnitude of EOp
in political participation, we compare IOp in political participation with IOp in income
acquisition. To date the latter has been the most extensively researched outcome dimension
by scholars in this literature. Figure 3 plots the Gini coeﬃcients and the mean log deviation
(MLD) of the smoothed distributions of gross personal income in Wave 3 and 4 as well as
the various dimensions of political participation. We additionally consider the MLD as an
inequality metric, as it has been the most widely used index in research on IOp in income
acquisition.
The vast diﬀerences in the Gini measures and the MLDs for political activities are con-
sistent with the results presented previously in terms of the dissimilarity index. Contacts
to oﬃcials, participation in rallies and marches and engagement in political organizations
are most unjustly distributed from an equal-opportunity perspective. Voting and volun-
tary work take a middle ground, while the registration to vote evokes the least normative
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Figure 3: Comparison to IOp in Gross Personal Income
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concern. The MLD of the smoothed distribution Φ of gross personal income attains a
value of 0.22 in Wave 3 and 0.16 in Wave 4. This is higher than other estimates of IOp
in annual income in the US based on PSID data (Niehues and Peichl, 2014).8 However it
still considerably falls short of IOp in the most unjustly distributed dimensions of political
participation.
4.2 Complementarity and Age Convergence
To this stage it has been shown that IOp in political participation does exist to varying
degrees along the activities of interest. In the following we want to address two potential
objections that could challenge the normative import of our ﬁndings.
First, concerns about existing injustices in the democratic process could be mitigated
if opportunity sets in political activities were substitutes rather than complements. In
the case of substitutability, a disadvantaged type in one dimension would be among the
advantaged types in other dimensions. For instance one could imagine that types lacking
trust in elected institutions prefer to advocate their interest in form of rallies and protest
marches instead of drafting a petition to a government representative. Therefore, these
types would not be cut out from the political realm on opportunity grounds per se. Rather
one would conclude that diﬀerent types use diﬀerent channels of political participation.
8Diﬀerences may arise from diﬀerent sample compositions between our data set and the PSID used by
Niehues and Peichl (2014). However, note that we include a more comprehensive circumstance set than
the former work, which by necessity implies an upwards correction of the lower bound estimate. See our
previous discussion in section 2.
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To the contrary, in the case of complementarity a disadvantage in one dimension would
be accompanied by disadvantages in all other dimensions as well. Panel 1 of Table 4 lists
correlations of type-speciﬁc propensities for all modes of participation drawn from Wave 3
of Add Health.
Table 4: Type-Specﬁcic Propensity Correlations
Registered
(2000)
Vote
(2000)
Contact
Oﬃcial
Rally/
March
Political
Org.
Volunteer
Work
Vote
Never
Vote
Always
Wave 3
(2001/02)
Registered
(2000) 1.000
Vote
(2000) 0.761
∗∗∗ 1.000
Contact
Oﬃcial 0.208
∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗ 1.000
Rally/
March 0.289
∗∗∗ 0.346∗∗∗ 0.341∗∗∗ 1.000
Political
Org. 0.183
∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗ 0.324∗∗∗ 0.246∗∗∗ 1.000
Volunteer
Work 0.449
∗∗∗ 0.539∗∗∗ 0.345∗∗∗ 0.375∗∗∗ 0.295∗∗∗ 1.000
Wave 4
(2008)
Vote
Never -0.704
∗∗∗ -0.776∗∗∗ -0.254∗∗∗ -0.344∗∗∗ -0.194∗∗∗ -0.509∗∗∗ 1.000
Vote
Always 0.500
∗∗∗ 0.565∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗ 0.323∗∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗ 0.338∗∗∗ -0.641∗∗∗ 1.000
Note: ∗,∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1%-level, respectively. All coeﬃcients are
weighted to account for sampling procedure and sample attrition through waves 3 and 4.
The fact that all correlations are signiﬁcantly positive points to the conclusion that
opportunities for diﬀerent political activities are complements rather than substitutes: a
high type-speciﬁc propensity to vote goes hand in hand with a positive propensity to
contact an oﬃcial, to participate in a rally and to engage in both political and civic
organizations.
The second potential objection goes as follows: it has been shown that initial diﬀerences
in political behavior tend to converge over the life cycle irrespective of socio-economic char-
acteristics (Plutzer, 2002). Therefore, concerns about existing injustices could be mitigated
if opportunity sets in political activities quickly converged over the life cycle of citizens.
Since the results presented thus far are exclusively based on respondents aged 18-24, some
may argue that they represent IOp in political initiation rather political participation tout
court. To address this concern we can make use of the participation categories Vote Never
and Vote Always. As outlined in section 3, the question on the regularity of participation
in local and statewide elections is drawn from Wave 4 of Add Health, i.e. when each re-
spondent was six years older in age compared to the previous wave. Employing the full
circumstance set the dissimilarity index for participation in every election attains a value
of 22.4%. Reversely, the dissimilarity index for never casting a vote in any election attains
a value of 24.5% (Table 3). In spite of the fact that these questions on voting behavior are
not directly comparable to the ones in Wave 3, we can infer that unequal opportunities
continue to exist in Wave 4. Furthermore, Panel 2 of Table 4 shows that types with a
higher propensity to be always-voter are more likely to engage in all dimensions of politi-
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cal activity measured in Wave 3. Reversely, being a never-voter is consistently negatively
correlated with political engagement in the previous wave.
To conclude, neither is it the case that political opportunities across diﬀerent activities
substitute each other, nor do type-speciﬁc propensities to engage politically quickly con-
verge over time. Thus the normative concern implicit in our previous results remains in
place.
4.3 Genetics and EOp
As mentioned previously, this is the ﬁrst work that explicitly exploits genetic variation
in the measurement of EOp. Therefore, we will devote this section to a more thorough
discussion of the inﬂuence of genetic circumstances on EOp.
There is philosophical controversy on whether the genetic endowment of a person pro-
vides a ground for compensation. Clearly genes are part of the natural lottery and are
beyond individual control. Yet some argue that the ethical principle of self-ownership
takes priority over the value of equal opportunities, leading to the conclusion that people
have a legitimate claim on life outcomes rooted in their genetic make-up. For instance,
in his seminal contribution Rawls (1971) argues that fair equality of opportunity only
requires compensation for social circumstances, but not for natural circumstances.
To date the empirical literature on EOp at most accounts for proxy variables for genetic
circumstances. Björklund et al. (2012), for instance, use IQ measures from the Swedish
Military Enlistment Battery measured at age 18. Yet as the authors remark, it is not
clear to what extent such ability measures reﬂect nature (genetic endowments) or nurture
(childhood circumstances). In humans genetic information is stored on 46 chromosomes,
half of which are received from each of the biological parents respectively. Chromosomes
contain chains of the macromolecule deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA). DNA is composed of two
strands of sugar and phosphate molecules that are connected by corresponding base pairs.
Adenine (A) always pairs with thymine (T) while guanine (G) always pairs with cytosine
(C). The two strands coil around each other to form the famous double helix structure. In
total, one set of chromosomes consists of 3.3bn base pairs of which 3% are protein coding
(exons), whereas the remainder is believed to have a regulatory function (introns). Genes
are segments of the DNA that are involved in the coding of proteins. Genetic diﬀerences
are denoted as alleles (or polymorphisms). As one chromosome is inherited of each parent,
children also inherit one allele for a particular gene from each parent.
Add Health provides two diﬀerent sorts of genetic markers:9 variable number tandem
repeats (VNTR) for six genes (MAOA, DRD4, DAT1, DRD5, MAOCA1, HTTLPR) and
single-nucleotide polymorphisms (SNP) in the genes HTTLPR, DRD2, COMT and 5HTT.
VNTRs code repeats of base pair sequences on a gene. For instance, the enzyme monoamine
oxidase A (MAOA) is involved in the degradation of serotonin in the brain. It is coded
9For more information on genetic markers in Add Health see Smolen et al. (2013)
14
on the gene MAOA, which contains a 30 base pair sequence, which varies between 2 and 5
repeat units depending on the allelic expression. The two repeat (2R) and the three repeat
(3R) expression are believed to be more eﬃcient in the transcription of the necessary amino
acids for the formation of the MAOA enzyme than the alternative expressions. Deﬁciencies
in the degradation of serotonin have been shown to be negatively correlated with pro-social
behaviors, which in turn led political scientists to hypothesize that low-expressing MAOA
VNTR's lead to lower degrees of political participation (Fowler and Dawes, 2008). Instead
of recording genetic variation with respect to base pair repeats, SNPs indicate alternations
in the base pairs at a particular locus. For instance, the SNP rs12945042 refers to the 5HTT
gene. At this particular location of the DNA, the majority base pair C-G is replaced by a
T-A base pair in the minority allele. As MAOA, 5HTT is involved in the degradation of
serotonin. Thus, to the extent that one allele is more transcriptionally eﬃcient than the
other, we would expect diﬀerential political participation across the carriers of the diﬀerent
allele expressions. Note that in contrast to VNTRs genetic variation due to SNPs can take
at most three expressions. A person can inherit the minor allele from none, one, or both
biological parents. For one gene (HTTLPR) we use a combination of both VNTRs and
SNPs. Previous research has shown that a minor allele SNP (G) on long versions of the
HTTLPR VNRT is less active than long versions with the more common variant (A). Thus
shorter versions of this VNTR should be analyzed jointly with long versions that carry the
minor allele SNP. The more active alleles are indicated as L' while the less active alleles
are coded as S' (see Table 10).
In general the genetic information in Add Health is relatively limited. To date genome-
wide sequencing has detected 84.7mn SNPs and 60,000 structural variants of which VNTRs
are a subset (Altshuler et al., 2015). Thus, the genetic circumstance set employed in this
study is far from capturing the entirety of genetic variation causally related to political
participation.10
Table 5 shows results on IOp in political participation with respect to diﬀerent cir-
cumstance scenarios. The ﬁrst line of each panel repeats the benchmark IOp measure
accounting for all available circumstances (see Table 3) for each dimension of interest.
Drawing on bootstrapped standard errors, we contrast this measure with two alternative
scenarios.
First, we calculate IOp using circumstance sets based on genetic information only.
We see that a relatively small fraction of IOp is explained independently by the set of
available genetic markers. This ﬁnding is unsurprising in view of the paucity of genetic
information in our data set. Political participation is a highly polygenic trait, i.e. a large
amount of genetic variants with very small individual eﬀect sizes explain the heritability
10Obviously this will lead us to underestimate the impact of genetic circumstances. To some extent this
downward bias is mitigated by the fact that alleles are in linkage disequilibrium. This property states that
the correlation of alleles increases with their proximity on the respective chromosome (Altshuler et al.,
2015). It will bias the point estimates of the speciﬁc genetic variants upwards but brings us closer to the
true amount of variation in political participation explained by genetic information.
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Table 5: Genetic Inﬂuence (Bootstrapped Results)
Outcome N Circ. Set
Diss.
Index
Lower
CI
Upper
CI
Diﬀerence
(p-value)
Political Participation
Registered (2000) 8142 All Circumstances 9.5% 8.7% 10.4%
Genetic Endowment Only 2.5% 1.9% 3.2% 7.0(0.000)
W/o Genetic Endowment 9.2% 8.3% 10.0% 0.4(0.000)
Vote (2000) 8111 All Circumstances 19.8% 18.4% 21.2%
Genetic Endowment Only 4.8% 3.6% 5.9% 15.0(0.000)
W/o Genetic Endowment 19.2% 17.8% 20.6% 0.6(0.001)
Contact Oﬃcial 8170 All Circumstances 59.7% 55.2% 64.1%
Genetic Endowment Only 23.6% 18.4% 28.8% 36.0(0.000)
W/o Genetic Endowment 56.3% 51.7% 60.9% 3.3(0.001)
Rally/March 8170 All Circumstances 55.4% 50.6% 60.2%
Genetic Endowment Only 20.6% 15.1% 26.1% 34.8(0.000)
W/o Genetic Endowment 51.7% 47.1% 56.3% 3.7(0.000)
Political Organization 8147 All Circumstances 63.0% 56.9% 69.1%
Genetic Endowment Only 23.4% 16.7% 30.1% 39.6(0.000)
W/o Genetic Endowment 58.8% 52.9% 64.7% 4.2(0.001)
Volunteer Work 8147 All Circumstances 24.0% 22.2% 25.8%
Genetic Endowment Only 5.9% 4.3% 7.4% 18.1(0.000)
W/o Genetic Endowment 23.3% 21.5% 25.0% 0.7(0.004)
Vote Always 8145 All Circumstances 22.4% 20.5% 24.4%
Genetic Endowment Only 9.1% 7.3% 11.0% 13.3(0.000)
W/o Genetic Endowment 21.3% 19.3% 23.2% 1.1(0.001)
Vote Never 8145 All Circumstances 24.5% 23.0% 26.1%
Genetic Endowment Only 7.4% 5.9% 8.9% 17.1(0.000)
W/o Genetic Endowment 23.8% 22.3% 25.4% 0.7(0.002)
Other Outcomes
Personal Income W3 (k$) 7745 All Circumstances 23.3% 18.9% 27.8%
Genetic Endowment Only 3.0% 1.2% 4.8% 20.3(0.000)
W/o Genetic Endowment 21.7% 17.4% 26.0% 1.7(0.007)
Personal Income W4 (k$) 8045 All Circumstances 30.7% 27.1% 34.2%
Genetic Endowment Only 10.6% 8.4% 12.9% 20.1(0.000)
W/o Genetic Endowment 28.8% 25.4% 32.2% 1.9(0.000)
Very Good/Excellent Health 8180 All Circumstances 14.5% 13.4% 15.6%
Genetic Endowment Only 3.6% 2.7% 4.5% 10.9(0.000)
W/o Genetic Endowment 14.2% 13.1% 15.3% 0.3(0.020)
High School Diploma 8180 All Circumstances 4.7% 4.1% 5.4%
Genetic Endowment Only 1.4% 1.0% 1.8% 3.3(0.000)
W/o Genetic Endowment 4.6% 3.9% 5.2% 0.1(0.004)
(Some) Tertiary Educ. 8179 All Circumstances 18.3% 17.2% 19.4%
Genetic Endowment Only 4.6% 3.8% 5.5% 13.7(0.000)
W/o Genetic Endowment 18.1% 17.0% 19.2% 0.2(0.015)
Note: Conﬁdence intervals at the 95%-level and p-values are calculated based on bootstrapped results with 1000 draws. p-
values refer to one-sided tests, as to whether the inclusion of the respective circumstance set causes a statistically signiﬁcant
upwards correction of the IOp measure.
of political participation. For comparison take a recent genome-wide association study
that investigated genetic variants associated with educational attainment (Okbay et al.,
2016). The authors found 74 SNPs that showed a signiﬁcant association with educational
attainment measured in years of schooling. Jointly these SNPs explained only 0.43% of
the observed variation in the outcome variable while the strongest association of a single
SNP yielded a R2 of 0.035%.
Second, we remove genetic information to obtain a standard set of circumstances as it
has been used in previous research on IOp. Focusing on the p-values in the last column,
we can conclude that the integration of genetic endowments into the set of circumstances
indeed provides a statistically signiﬁcant upward correction of all IOp measures.
To conﬁrm the importance of genetic information we repeat this procedure for other
outcomes that are prominent in the literature: personal gross income, self-rated health
status and two measures of educational achievement. Again the genetic circumstance set
causes a statistically signiﬁcant upward correction of the IOp measure. This ﬁnding is
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particularly relevant as most applied research on EOp relies on a lower bound estimation
method (Niehues and Peichl, 2014). The information we use with respect to childhood cir-
cumstances is already comprehensive in comparison to previous works on IOp. Thus one
could have expected that much of the genetic variation was already reﬂected in the set of
childhood circumstances which are shaped subsequent to the natural lottery of distribut-
ing genetic endowments. The fact that genetic information still provides an independent
upward correction of IOp indicates that the increasing availability of large-scale genetic
data sets may be fruitfully exploited in future empirical works of IOp.11 Add Health it-
self plans to sequence its available saliva samples, which will make available genome-wide
information that goes far beyond the candidate genes used in this study. Once available,
this data could be used to construct polygenic risk scores (Dudbridge, 2013) that compile
relevant genetic information for thousands of SNPs into one index variable.
4.4 Underlying Mechanisms
It is important to note that it is beyond the ambit of the current analysis to establish
causal claims on the inﬂuence of speciﬁc circumstances on the existing political opportu-
nity structure in the US. To guide policy, however, it is indispensable to move beyond the
exploratory approach of the current analysis and to gain an understanding of the mecha-
nisms at play.12 After all, is it neighborhood characteristics or demographics (or any other
factor) that drives the opportunity gap in political participation? Depending on the answer
policy recommendations may be radically diﬀerent. To respond to this quest we rely on
two decomposition exercises. First, we use the Shapley value decomposition methodology
proposed by Shorrocks (2012) to display which circumstance group provides the strongest
contribution to IOp as presented in Table 3. Second, we introduce selected eﬀort variables
into the analytic framework for the purpose of analyzing the extent to which the diﬀerent
circumstance groups exert an indirect inﬂuence through individual eﬀort. Hereby we rely
on a recent methodology developed by Gelbach (2016).
In contrast to other decomposition methodologies, the Shapley value procedure over-
comes the issue of path-dependency in evaluating diﬀerent contribution factors. Therefore
it delivers unbiased and additive decomposition results, i.e. the calculated contributions
sum to the total measure of inequality. We implement the decomposition as follows. There
11Furthermore it is conceivable to use genetic data to reﬁne empirical estimates of IOp with respect to
diﬀerent philosophical accounts. To the extent that childhood circumstances are correlated with genetic
endowments, current estimates of IOp implicitly treat returns to genetic endowments as ethically objec-
tionable and thus take a contested normative standpoint. To correct for this shortcoming one could adjust
the empirical framework used in this work. Similar to our approach one would use genetic circumstances as
controls in equation 2. However subsequently they would be neglected in the construction of the smoothed
distribution (equation 3). The result would be the true measure of IOp net of genetic inﬂuence as coeﬃ-
cients on childhood circumstances were no longer biased by correlations with antecedent genetic factors.
This procedure, however, requires a data set with genetic information akin to the one used for the purpose
of this analysis.
12For instance Kanbur and Wagstaﬀ (2014) question the policy relevance of the existing EOp literature
on these grounds.
17
are 11 circumstance groups (Ωm with m = 11): demographics, family, social life, neighbor-
hood, school, ability, religion, physical condition, psychological condition, risk behavior,
genetic endowment. Starting from the full circumstance set, we now sequentially elimi-
nate each circumstance group and run the estimation procedure outlined in section 2. To
take account of the inherent path dependency we repeat this exercise for each possible
elimination sequence. We diﬀerence the results for the dissimilarity indexes prior to and
after the elimination of each circumstance group. Calculating the weighted average over
all possible elimination sequences then gives the eﬀect of a circumstance group. The sec-
ond column of Table 6 shows the previously calculated measure of the dissimilarity index.
The ﬁrst column to the right of the respective circumstance group indicates its absolute
percentage point contribution to the dissimilarity index. The rightmost column shows the
relative contribution in percent. We limit the presentation of the results to the top three
circumstance groups per outcome dimension. The full list of results is appended in Table
11.
Table 6: Shapley Value Decomposition
Outcome Diss. Index Ωm Contrib. in %
Registered (2000) 9.5% Family 2.0pp 21.0%
Psychological Condition 1.5pp 16.0%
Demographics 1.2pp 12.5%
Vote (2000) 19.8% Family 4.0pp 20.3%
Psychological Condition 3.5pp 17.7%
Risk Behavior 2.0pp 10.1%
Contact Oﬃcial 59.7% Family 13.7pp 23.0%
Psychological Condition 10.4pp 17.4%
Genetic Endowment 7.5pp 12.5%
Rally/March 55.4% Family 13.0pp 23.5%
Psychological Condition 8.3pp 14.9%
Genetic Endowment 6.7pp 12.2%
Political Organization 63.0% Family 11.5pp 18.3%
Psychological Condition 11.2pp 17.8%
Genetic Endowment 7.7pp 12.3%
Volunteer Work 24.0% Family 4.7pp 19.8%
Psychological Condition 4.2pp 17.4%
Risk Behavior 3.0pp 12.5%
Vote Always 22.4% Family 4.2pp 18.6%
Psychological Condition 3.6pp 16.0%
Neighborhood 3.3pp 14.9%
Vote Never 24.5% Family 5.4pp 22.2%
Psychological Condition 4.5pp 18.3%
Demographics 2.2pp 9.1%
Note: The Shapley decompositions in this table are based on the results from the logit
estimator. The last two columns indicate the Shapley value contribution of the respective
circumstance set.
For each activity the results are ordered in decreasing magnitude of contribution.
Among the circumstance groups under consideration, Family stands out as the one group
that consistently ranks as the top contribution factor. This ﬁnding is consistent with pre-
vious studies that have conﬁrmed the particular importance of parental education in the
intergenerational transmission of political participation (Brady et al., 2015). Furthermore,
the circumstances related to the child's psychological condition are the second most im-
portant contributors to all considered dimensions of political participation. Most variables
considered in this group relate to the concept of self-eﬃcacy understood as the people's
beliefs about their capabilities to produce designated levels of performance that exercise
inﬂuence over the events that aﬀect their lives (Bandura, 1998). Therefore, our ﬁnding
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conﬁrms previous research that considers a sense of political self-eﬃcacy as one of the
determining factors of political participation (Finkel, 1985). To the contrary, given its
prominence in the academic literature (Jones-Correa and Leal, 2001) the small inﬂuence
of the religious background of the respondents is striking. A similar conclusion holds for
the categories Social Life, School, Ability and Physical Condition, all of which account for
less than 10% of the explained variation in each activity of interest.
A novel procedure proposed by Gelbach (2016) focuses on the change of a coeﬃcient
of interest when introducing additional covariates. Thereby the researcher is able to tease
out the extent to which the coeﬃcient of interest in a restricted regression is biased due
to correlation with other determining factors. We employ this methodology in order to
detect those circumstance groups that exert a particularly strong indirect inﬂuence on po-
litical participation through selected eﬀort variables. As the Shapley value decomposition
Gelbach's method is path independent, i.e. it is irrelevant in which order the researcher
introduces additional covariates.
The logic of the decomposition is most easily illustrated by a simple example.13 Assume
the outcome of interest was voting in the 2000 Presidential election, having a high school
degree was the sole eﬀort variable, and having rich parents was the sole circumstance of
interest. We want to explain the share of the educational gap in vote participation that
is explained by diﬀerential ﬁnancial endowments of parents. First, we regress the vote
participation on both the child's educational achievement (eﬀort) and parental ﬁnancial
endowment (circumstance). On the circumstance variable, we obtain the coeﬃcient βj
which can be interpreted as the impact of rich parents on vote casting conditional on ed-
ucational achievement. Say βj = 0.2, i.e. oﬀspring of rich parents had a 20 percentage
points higher propensity to turn out at the polls than individuals that grew up in poor
households. In a second step, we regress the ﬁnancial endowment of parents on the educa-
tional achievement of their children. On the eﬀort variable we now obtain the coeﬃcient
γjl that is indicative for the ﬁnancial composition of parent households of the two eﬀort
groups. Say γjl = 0.1, i.e. observing an individual with a high school degree, it is 10 per-
centage points more likely that this person grew up in a rich instead of a poor household.
Gelbach (2016) shows that the product of both coeﬃcients, ∆j = βj ∗ γjl , yields exactly
the participation gap attributable to the speciﬁc circumstance variable. In our example,
∆j = βj ∗ γjl = 0.2 ∗ 0.1 = 0.02, i.e. 0.02 percentage points in the observed participation
gap between high school graduates and drop-outs are caused by diﬀerential ﬁnancial en-
dowments in parental households. Or alternatively: if education was equally distributed
across households regardless of parental ﬁnancial endowments, stratiﬁcation by high school
graduation status would shrink by 0.02 percentage points.
Table 7 lists summary statistics for our eﬀort variables of choice.14 We use four variables
13A more formal illustration of this method is provided in Appendix A.3.
14Alternatively, these variables could also be called responsibility factors. While this label may be
intuitively more compelling it is important to note that our interpretation of EOp complies with Roemer's
control view as opposed to the Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2011) formulation (see also Trannoy, 2016, for a
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Table 7: Eﬀort Variables (Summary Statistics)
N Mean Mean
(Weighted)
SD SD
(Weighted)
Min Max
Wave 4 (2008)
PVT Score W3 18392 100.025 101.634 14.930 14.515 13.000 146.000
Highschool Diploma 14151 0.896 0.884 0.305 0.321 0.000 1.000
(Some) Tertiary Educ. 14153 0.487 0.472 0.500 0.499 0.000 1.000
Log Personal Income W3 13280 8.340 8.330 2.632 2.635 0.000 13.124
Inst. Trust 14100 0.532 0.544 0.499 0.498 0.000 1.000
Identify with Pol. Party 13955 0.348 0.329 0.476 0.470 0.000 1.000
Note: In the weighted columns summary statistics are corrected for sampling procedure and sample attrition until Wave 3.
to proxy SES: ability measured by the PVT score in Wave 3, educational attainment
measured by whether individuals graduated from high school and whether they had some
tertiary education, and lastly the logarithm of personal income in Wave 3. Clearly, all
of these SES proxies are eﬀort variables to the extent that it is (partially) under the
discretion of individuals to achieve the desired level of status. We furthermore construct
a binary variable for institutional trust which takes value one if a person claims to trust
the government at either central, state or local level.15 Trust is an eﬀort as it aﬀords
knowledge and information on behalf of the truster with respect to the trustee (Levi and
Stoker, 2000), both of which are under the (partial) control of individuals. Similarly, we
account for party identiﬁcation as an eﬀort variable under the assumption that partisan
preferences are informed by political knowledge and information gathering on policy issues
(Niemi and Jennings, M. Kent, 1991).
Table 8 presents results from regressing the measures of political participation on the set
of eﬀort variables, once unconditional and once conditional on the full set of circumstances.
The associated change in coeﬃcients on the eﬀort variables is denoted by βl − βΩl = ∆.
succinct comparison.). Therefore, we stick to his original wording for internal consistency.
15In principle we could measure trust at each of the three levels and consider them independently. As
trust in the diﬀerent levels of government is highly collinear (correlations of close to 90%), we prefer to
rely on the aggregate measure of institutional trust.
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It is noteworthy that SES as measured by ability and educational achievement are
strong determinants of political participation across most dimensions of activity, whereas
the independent inﬂuence of personal income is negligible. Only with respect to being an
always-voter personal income exerts a small negative eﬀect signiﬁcant at the 10%-level.16
However, this eﬀect vanishes when controlling for individual circumstances. Similarly,
identiﬁcation with a political party consistently exerts a signiﬁcant positive inﬂuence on
political participation across all dimensions under consideration. The evidence on the in-
ﬂuence of institutional trust is somewhat mixed. People that claim to trust the government
on average register and vote with a higher probability of around 3 percentage points as
opposed to non-trusting individuals. Furthermore, more institutional trust is signiﬁcantly
correlated with a higher propensity for volunteer work and a lower probability of being
a never-voter. The coeﬃcients on all eﬀort variables for which we ﬁnd a statistically
signiﬁcant relation to political participation are attenuated when accounting for the full
set of individual circumstances.
In Table 9 we present results of the decomposition of the change in coeﬃcients according
to the eleven circumstance groups: ∆ =
∑
m ∆
m. For each outcome-eﬀort dyad we present
the top three contributors to ∆ conditional on βl, β
Ω
l and ∆
m being signiﬁcant at least
at the 10%-level. Columns 1 and 2 indicate the outcome-eﬀort dyad, while Column 4 and
5 show the coeﬃcient change ∆ in absolute and relative terms. The last three columns
show the results of the decomposition by circumstance group, again both in absolute and
relative terms.
Table 9: Gelbach Decomposition
Outcome Eﬀort ∆ in % Ωm ∆m in %
Registered (2000) Ability 0.001*** 37% Demographics 0.001** 130%
(0.000) (0.001)
Family 0.001*** 56%
(0.000)
Psychological Condition 0.000* 20%
(0.000)
High School Diploma 0.023*** 21% Religion 0.007*** 33%
(0.008) (0.002)
Risk Behavior 0.005** 24%
(0.003)
School 0.004* 17%
(0.002)
Identify with Pol. Party 0.033*** 16% Demographics 0.010* 30%
(0.005) (0.005)
Religion 0.005*** 14%
(0.002)
Family 0.005** 14%
(0.002)
Vote (2000) High School Diploma 0.040*** 40% Genetic Endowment 0.031* 78%
(0.009) (0.017)
Demographics -0.028* -72%
(0.016)
Family 0.014*** 36%
(0.005)
(Some) Tertiary Educ. 0.038*** 27% Demographics -0.049*** -130%
(0.007) (0.017)
Genetic Endowment 0.035** 94%
(0.018)
Family 0.026*** 68%
(0.005)
Identify with Pol. Party 0.043*** 13% Demographics 0.012* 28%
(0.005) (0.007)
Neighborhood 0.007*** 16%
Continued on next page
16It is small in the sense that a 10% increase in personal income decreases the likelihood of being an
always-voter by 0.05 percentage points. Note that the negative eﬀect obtains conditional on all other
eﬀort variables, for example the educational status of a person.
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Table 9  Continued from previous page
Outcome Eﬀort ∆ in % Ωm ∆m in %
(0.002)
Psychological Condition 0.006*** 14%
(0.002)
Contact Oﬃcial Ability 0.000** 19% Family 0.000* 49%
(0.000) (0.000)
(Some) Tertiary Educ. 0.008*** 33% Family 0.005*** 66%
(0.003) (0.002)
Religion 0.001* 14%
(0.001)
School -0.001* -11%
(0.001)
Rally/March Ability 0.000*** 36% Physical Condition 0.000* 7%
(0.000) (0.000)
(Some) Tertiary Educ. 0.008*** 26% Family 0.005*** 67%
(0.003) (0.002)
Risk Behavior 0.003* 33%
(0.001)
School -0.001* -13%
(0.001)
Identify with Pol. Party 0.004** 11% Family 0.002*** 50%
(0.002) (0.001)
Psychological Condition 0.001* 28%
(0.001)
Social Life -0.001** -26%
(0.000)
Volunteer Work Ability 0.001** 30% Psychological Condition 0.000*** 59%
(0.000) (0.000)
Ability -0.000*** -39%
(0.000)
Religion -0.000*** -20%
(0.000)
(Some) Tertiary Educ. 0.049*** 21% Family 0.017*** 35%
(0.007) (0.005)
Risk Behavior 0.013*** 26%
(0.003)
Psychological Condition 0.011*** 23%
(0.004)
Inst. Trust 0.014*** 39% Risk Behavior 0.007*** 47%
(0.004) (0.002)
Identify with Pol. Party 0.010** 13% Demographics -0.009** -96%
(0.005) (0.004)
Religion 0.008*** 87%
(0.002)
Psychological Condition 0.003** 35%
(0.001)
Vote Always Identify with Pol. Party 0.028*** 17% Neighborhood 0.006*** 23%
(0.004) (0.002)
Family 0.004** 15%
(0.002)
Psychological Condition 0.004** 13%
(0.001)
Vote Never Ability -0.001*** 34% Genetic Endowment 0.001** -118%
(0.000) (0.001)
Family -0.001*** 94%
(0.000)
Demographics -0.001* 93%
(0.001)
High School Diploma -0.057*** 54% Family -0.025*** 44%
(0.009) (0.005)
Genetic Endowment -0.025* 43%
(0.013)
Demographics 0.023* -41%
(0.013)
(Some) Tertiary Educ. -0.047*** 34% Demographics 0.044*** -93%
(0.007) (0.017)
Family -0.036*** 77%
(0.005)
Genetic Endowment -0.035** 74%
(0.017)
Identify with Pol. Party -0.052*** 25% Neighborhood -0.008*** 14%
(0.005) (0.002)
Family -0.006** 11%
(0.002)
School -0.006*** 11%
(0.001)
Note: Gelbach decompositions are based on the OLS estimator. ∆ is the diﬀerence between βl and β
Ω
l , i.e. the point
estimate of the respective eﬀort variable with and without circumstance controls. The last two columns indicate the
contributions of the respective circumstance sets to ∆.
For the sake of brevity, we will focus the discussion on voting in the 2000 Presidential
election. Let us focus on the aggregate impact of circumstances, ∆, ﬁrst. In the case of
voting in 2000, the impact of the two variables on education are most strongly stratiﬁed
by circumstance factors. If the aggregate impact of circumstances on the probability of
obtaining a high school degree had been neutralized, the participation gap between high
school graduates and drop-outs would have been 4 percentage points (or 40%) lower in
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this election. Analogously, the turnout gap between those who went to college and those
who did not would have been lowered by 3.8 percentage points (27%) if factors beyond
individual control had been uncorrelated to the probability of obtaining at least some ter-
tiary education. In general the results indicate that circumstances are a strong contributor
to the observed stratiﬁcation of political participation by educational status, ranging from
21% in the dyad Tertiary Education-Volunteer Work up to 54% in the dyad High School
Diploma-Vote Never. In the case of party identiﬁcation the relevant range lies somewhat
lower between 11% (Rally/March) and 25% (Vote Never). As regards institutional trust,
we detect only one statistically signiﬁcant relationship: a neutralization of circumstance
inﬂuence on institutional trust would decrease the stratiﬁcation of volunteer work between
trusting and non-trusting individuals by 1 percentage point (14%).
The last two columns of Table 9 further decompose the aggregate indirect impact of
circumstances through eﬀort into the contributions of the eleven circumstance groups. It
is noteworthy that not all circumstance groups have a dis-equalizing indirect eﬀect on
political opportunities in the US. To the contrary some circumstances mitigate the diﬀer-
ential inﬂuence other circumstance groups exert. For instance in the case of vote casting
in the 2000 Presidential election, genetics were the strongest contributors to the stratiﬁ-
cation along the high school graduation divide. 78% of the 4 percentage point impact of
circumstances could be attributed to this circumstance group, i.e. stratiﬁcation between
high school graduates and non-graduates would have been 3.1 percentage points lower
if genetics were uncorrelated to the probability of obtaining the respective degree. The
contrary conclusion holds for demographic circumstances. Had public policy been suc-
cessful in mitigating the inﬂuence of demographics on the probability of graduating from
high school, the participation gap would have increased by 2.8 percentage points. This
result is mainly driven by diﬀerential patterns in high school graduation rates and vote
casting across the sexes. Females had a lower participation (βj = −0.393) but higher
graduation rates (γjl = 0.073) than their male counterparts. Combining both estimates
∆j = −0.393 ∗ 0.073 = −0.029, which corresponds to the total equalizing contribution
of demographics (∆m = −0.028). A similar pattern is observable for the inﬂuence of
demographics (and biological sex in particular) on vote casting via diﬀerential tertiary ed-
ucation (∆j = −0.393 ∗ 0.085 = −0.033, ∆m = −0.049). To the contrary, the overall eﬀect
of demographics via partisanship is dis-equalizing (∆m = 0.012). These results highlight
that a mitigation of circumstance inﬂuence on eﬀort variables will instill heterogeneous
eﬀects along diﬀerent forms of participation. In this particular case, an opportunity equal-
izing policy targeted at demographic diﬀerences would have decreased stratiﬁcation by
partisanship, while it would have magniﬁed stratiﬁcation by educational achievement.
Lastly, a comparison of the Gelbach decomposition with the Shapley value exercise
suggests that the patterns of indirect circumstance inﬂuence via selected eﬀort variables
diﬀer strongly from overall circumstance impact. While the results from the Shapley
value decomposition suggests that family background characteristics and psychological
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dispositions during childhood consistently are the strongest contributors to the observed
opportunity structure in political participation, the pattern of indirect inﬂuence is less
clear. In the case of vote casting in the 2000 Presidential election, demographics evolve
among the top three contributors for all eﬀort variables that could be robustly associated
with the outcome of interest. To the contrary, psychological dispositions only play a role
via the partisanship channel (∆m = 0.006). Family background exerts a strong inﬂuence
through SES measured by educational attainment (∆m = 0.014 and ∆m = 0.026 for high
school graduation and tertiary education, respectively). Overall, the impact of the eleven
circumstance groups appears to be highly speciﬁc to the respective outcome-eﬀort dyad.
5 Conclusion
In this work we have presented the ﬁrst estimates of EOp in political participation. Using
rich panel data from the US, that allows us to track children into adulthood we have used
circumstance variables, i.e. factors beyond individual control, from eleven diﬀerent areas
(demographics, family, social life, neighborhood, school, ability, religion, physical condition,
psychological condition, risk behavior, genetic endowment) to partition the sample into
types. Based on this type partition we have constructed a counterfactual distribution that
is indicative for inequality in political participation as predicted by circumstances only, i.e.
the share of inequality that is unfair from an equal opportunity perspective.
We found that political opportunities are particularly unjustly distributed with respect
to contacts to oﬃcials, participation in rallies and marches, and the membership in politi-
cal organizations. Furthermore we have shown that a lack of opportunity in one dimension
is complemented by restricted opportunities in other dimensions of political participation
and that these inequalities do not vanish following the phase of political initiation. Among
the diﬀerent factors inﬂuencing EOp in political participation, the family background and
psychological dispositions during the childhood of individuals stand out as the factors that
consistently contribute in an important manner to all considered forms of political partici-
pation. The indirect inﬂuence of circumstances through eﬀort variables is sizable. However
in comparison to the overall impact of circumstances on political participation the inﬂu-
ence patterns across the diﬀerent forms of participation are less clear and dependent on the
respective outcome-eﬀort dyad. The integration of genetic circumstances yields a relatively
small, yet statistically signiﬁcant upward correction of our lower bound IOp measure. This
suggests that much of the variation due to the genetic lottery is reﬂected in circumstances
that are observed without genotype information. Nevertheless it is important to recall that
the amount of genetic information used in this study is rather limited. The human genome
is believed to consist of about 25,000 genes (Plomin et al., 2008) of which we cover only
a tiny fraction in our genetic circumstance set. Thus the amount of genetic inﬂuence on
IOp may be shown to be greater in future research as the availability of genetic databases
expands.
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A Appendix
A.1 Circumstance Variables (Summary Statistics)
Table 10: Circumstance Variables (Summary Statistics)
N Mean Mean
(Weighted)
SD SD
(Weighted)
Min Max
Demographics
Female 19263 0.509 0.498 0.500 0.500 0.000 1.000
Race: White 19255 0.579 0.703 0.494 0.457 0.000 1.000
Race: Black 19255 0.213 0.150 0.409 0.357 0.000 1.000
Race: Asian 19255 0.065 0.036 0.247 0.187 0.000 1.000
Race: Other Non-White 19255 0.143 0.110 0.350 0.313 0.000 1.000
Born in US 19262 0.915 0.942 0.279 0.234 0.000 1.000
Birth/Year: '76 19263 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000 1.000
Birth/Year: '77 19263 0.200 0.183 0.400 0.387 0.000 1.000
Birth/Year: '78 19263 0.213 0.177 0.410 0.382 0.000 1.000
Birth/Year: '79 19263 0.204 0.177 0.403 0.382 0.000 1.000
Birth/Year: '80 19263 0.167 0.184 0.373 0.387 0.000 1.000
Birth/Year: '81 19263 0.129 0.166 0.336 0.372 0.000 1.000
Birth/Year: >'81 19263 0.087 0.112 0.281 0.315 0.000 1.000
Family
Orphan (Mother) 19263 0.041 0.023 0.198 0.149 0.000 1.000
Orphan (Father) 19263 0.133 0.101 0.339 0.301 0.000 1.000
No Father in HH 19263 0.296 0.264 0.457 0.441 0.000 1.000
No Mother in HH 19263 0.055 0.051 0.228 0.220 0.000 1.000
HH-Size: <3 19258 0.224 0.242 0.417 0.429 0.000 1.000
HH-Size: 3 19258 0.316 0.337 0.465 0.473 0.000 1.000
HH-Size: 4 19258 0.234 0.232 0.423 0.422 0.000 1.000
HH-Size: 5 19258 0.121 0.104 0.326 0.306 0.000 1.000
HH-Size: 6 19258 0.051 0.043 0.221 0.203 0.000 1.000
HH-Size: >6 19258 0.054 0.042 0.226 0.200 0.000 1.000
No Siblings 19263 0.207 0.219 0.405 0.414 0.000 1.000
# Siblings: 1 19263 0.376 0.394 0.484 0.489 0.000 1.000
# Siblings: 2 19263 0.252 0.241 0.434 0.428 0.000 1.000
# Siblings: 3 19263 0.108 0.095 0.310 0.293 0.000 1.000
# Siblings: 4 19263 0.035 0.030 0.183 0.171 0.000 1.000
# Siblings: >4 19263 0.023 0.021 0.149 0.142 0.000 1.000
English @ Home 19261 0.892 0.929 0.310 0.258 0.000 1.000
Educ. Mom: HS/Voc. School/GED 19252 0.380 0.406 0.485 0.491 0.000 1.000
Educ. Mom: College Dropout 19252 0.119 0.115 0.324 0.320 0.000 1.000
Educ. Mom: College/Professional 19252 0.252 0.242 0.434 0.428 0.000 1.000
Not in HH/Don't Know/No Degree 19252 0.248 0.237 0.432 0.425 0.000 1.000
Educ. Dad: HS/Voc. School/GED 19249 0.258 0.280 0.438 0.449 0.000 1.000
Educ. Dad: College Dropout 19249 0.079 0.083 0.270 0.275 0.000 1.000
Educ. Dad: College/Professional 19249 0.216 0.225 0.412 0.418 0.000 1.000
Not in HH/Don't Know/No Degree 19249 0.446 0.412 0.497 0.492 0.000 1.000
Mom: Blue Collar 19248 0.269 0.261 0.443 0.439 0.000 1.000
Mom: White Collar 19248 0.531 0.552 0.499 0.497 0.000 1.000
Mom: Not in HH/No Job 19248 0.200 0.187 0.400 0.390 0.000 1.000
Dad: Blue Collar 19244 0.201 0.212 0.401 0.408 0.000 1.000
Dad: White Collar 19244 0.465 0.489 0.499 0.500 0.000 1.000
Dad: Not in HH/No Job 19244 0.334 0.299 0.472 0.458 0.000 1.000
HH-Member on Welfare? 19260 0.113 0.100 0.316 0.301 0.000 1.000
Home State: Very Well Kept 19249 0.539 0.567 0.499 0.496 0.000 1.000
Home State: Fairly Well 19249 0.315 0.292 0.465 0.455 0.000 1.000
Home State: Poor 19249 0.098 0.094 0.298 0.293 0.000 1.000
Home State: Very Poor 19249 0.048 0.046 0.213 0.211 0.000 1.000
Parent w/ Disability? 19263 0.112 0.114 0.315 0.318 0.000 1.000
Meals w/ Mom or Dad? >4 d/w 19251 0.659 0.693 0.474 0.461 0.000 1.000
Close to Mom? No Mom in HH 19256 0.055 0.051 0.228 0.220 0.000 1.000
Close to Mom? Not Close 19256 0.029 0.027 0.168 0.162 0.000 1.000
Close to Mom? Somewhat 19256 0.079 0.071 0.270 0.258 0.000 1.000
Close to Mom? Quite a Bit 19256 0.200 0.205 0.400 0.404 0.000 1.000
Close to Mom? Very Much 19256 0.637 0.645 0.481 0.478 0.000 1.000
Close to Dad? No Dad in HH 19255 0.296 0.264 0.457 0.441 0.000 1.000
Close to Dad? Not Close 19255 0.043 0.039 0.204 0.194 0.000 1.000
Close to Dad? Somewhat 19255 0.099 0.096 0.299 0.294 0.000 1.000
Close to Dad? Quite a Bit 19255 0.186 0.199 0.389 0.399 0.000 1.000
Close to Dad? Very Much 19255 0.375 0.402 0.484 0.490 0.000 1.000
Family w/ Suicide Attempt? 19145 0.045 0.044 0.208 0.206 0.000 1.000
Social Life
Friend Contact/Week: No Contact 19257 0.094 0.092 0.292 0.288 0.000 1.000
Friend Contact/Week: 1-2 19257 0.235 0.230 0.424 0.421 0.000 1.000
Friend Contact/Week: 3-4 19257 0.266 0.268 0.442 0.443 0.000 1.000
Friend Contact/Week: >5 19257 0.404 0.410 0.491 0.492 0.000 1.000
Friend Contact/Week: Other 19257 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.016 0.000 1.000
Socially Accepted? Agree 19234 0.843 0.852 0.364 0.355 0.000 1.000
Socially Accepted? Don't Know 19234 0.115 0.105 0.319 0.307 0.000 1.000
Socially Accepted? Disagree 19234 0.042 0.042 0.201 0.201 0.000 1.000
Friend w/ Suicide Attempt? 19136 0.174 0.179 0.379 0.384 0.000 1.000
Ever in Romantic Relation? 19193 0.546 0.531 0.498 0.499 0.000 1.000
No Sex yet 19113 0.626 0.659 0.484 0.474 0.000 1.000
First Sex (Age): <13 19113 0.050 0.048 0.217 0.215 0.000 1.000
First Sex (Age): 13-16 19113 0.245 0.223 0.430 0.416 0.000 1.000
First Sex (Age): >16 19113 0.062 0.056 0.241 0.230 0.000 1.000
First Sex (Age): Don't Know 19113 0.018 0.014 0.133 0.116 0.000 1.000
Homosexual Attraction 19263 0.035 0.037 0.184 0.189 0.000 1.000
Neighborhood
Witnessed Shootings? Never 19155 0.872 0.895 0.334 0.307 0.000 1.000
Witnessed Shootings? Once 19155 0.093 0.077 0.291 0.267 0.000 1.000
Witnessed Shootings? > Once 19155 0.035 0.028 0.184 0.166 0.000 1.000
Knife Pulled on You? Never 19160 0.869 0.882 0.337 0.322 0.000 1.000
Knife Pulled on You? Once 19160 0.103 0.093 0.304 0.291 0.000 1.000
Continued on next page
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N Mean Mean
(Weighted)
SD SD
(Weighted)
Min Max
Knife Pulled on You? > Once 19160 0.028 0.024 0.164 0.155 0.000 1.000
Private Schools (%, Tract) 19059 0.097 0.088 0.095 0.091 0.000 0.844
25+ w/o HS-Degree (%, Tract) 19096 0.284 0.271 0.144 0.140 0.000 0.874
Educ. Exp. (per capita, County) 19153 674.154 677.025 159.929 156.375 2.542 2281.676
Health Exp. (per capita, County) 19153 142.053 141.747 141.611 156.240 0.000 839.839
Welfare Exp. (per capita, County) 19153 76.399 58.058 103.578 88.500 0.000 473.003
Security Exp. (per capita, County) 19153 89.520 78.343 45.879 39.791 7.481 198.406
Children w/o Both Parents (%, Tract) 19076 0.270 0.251 0.169 0.165 0.012 1.000
Housing Vacancy (%, Tract) 19090 0.083 0.088 0.079 0.082 0.000 0.858
Housing w/o Plumbing (%, Tract) 19088 0.008 0.008 0.015 0.016 0.000 0.297
Median HH Income in k (Tract) 19075 30.887 30.006 13.399 12.558 4.999 125.053
SD HH Income in k (Tract) 19075 25.898 25.519 7.836 7.932 6.916 66.828
Poverty (%, Tract) 19094 0.145 0.144 0.123 0.121 0.000 0.864
Unemployment Rate (Tract) 19079 0.076 0.075 0.048 0.048 0.000 0.658
Pers./Sq.-km (Tract) 19098 1.807 1.388 3.424 3.016 0.000 69.172
Race Dispersion (Tract) 19094 0.317 0.254 0.272 0.241 0.000 0.933
Median Age (Tract) 19094 32.096 32.137 4.395 4.213 12.667 64.580
Foreign % (Tract) 19096 0.103 0.065 0.161 0.117 0.000 0.869
<1 Crime per 100 ppl 19263 0.691 0.792 0.462 0.406 0.000 1.000
1-2 Violent Crimes per 100 ppl 19263 0.274 0.187 0.446 0.390 0.000 1.000
>2 Violent Crimes per 100 ppl 19263 0.035 0.020 0.184 0.141 0.000 1.000
<3 Non-Violent Crimes per 100 ppl 19263 0.225 0.248 0.418 0.432 0.000 1.000
3-6 Non-Violent Crimes per 100 ppl 19263 0.522 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.000 1.000
>6 Non-Violent Crimes per 100 ppl 19263 0.253 0.253 0.435 0.434 0.000 1.000
Mail Vote pre-NVRA 19154 0.730 0.709 0.444 0.454 0.000 1.000
% Working Outside County 19154 0.222 0.243 0.182 0.181 0.017 0.738
Dem./Rep. % in 1992 Vote 19154 0.060 0.038 0.179 0.175 -0.408 0.624
School
Dist. School: <2km 19263 0.353 0.346 0.478 0.476 0.000 1.000
Dist. School: 2-5km 19263 0.328 0.311 0.469 0.463 0.000 1.000
Dist. School: 5-10km 19263 0.185 0.206 0.388 0.404 0.000 1.000
Dist. School: >10km 19263 0.134 0.137 0.340 0.344 0.000 1.000
Class Size: <20 19263 0.079 0.082 0.269 0.275 0.000 1.000
Class Size: 20-24 19263 0.165 0.191 0.371 0.393 0.000 1.000
Class Size: 25-29 19263 0.308 0.295 0.462 0.456 0.000 1.000
Class Size: >30 19263 0.449 0.433 0.497 0.495 0.000 1.000
% Female Teacher: <25 19263 0.012 0.016 0.109 0.127 0.000 1.000
% Female Teacher: 26-50 19263 0.256 0.199 0.437 0.399 0.000 1.000
% Female Teacher: 51-75 19263 0.359 0.344 0.480 0.475 0.000 1.000
% Female Teacher: >75 19263 0.373 0.441 0.484 0.496 0.000 1.000
% Teacher w/ MA: < 25 19263 0.158 0.113 0.365 0.317 0.000 1.000
% Teacher w/ MA: 26-50 19263 0.304 0.309 0.460 0.462 0.000 1.000
% Teacher w/ MA: 51-75 19263 0.169 0.162 0.375 0.368 0.000 1.000
% Teacher w/ MA: >75 19263 0.368 0.416 0.482 0.493 0.000 1.000
Ability
Skipped Grade 19252 0.028 0.021 0.164 0.143 0.000 1.000
Repeated Grade 19254 0.204 0.194 0.403 0.395 0.000 1.000
PVT Score W1 14133 130.343 135.715 161.384 171.509 9.000 996.000
Religion
No Religion 16525 0.063 0.069 0.242 0.253 0.000 1.000
# Parent: Rel. Service 1/Week 16525 0.385 0.367 0.487 0.482 0.000 1.000
# Parent: Rel. Service 1/Month 16525 0.187 0.190 0.390 0.393 0.000 1.000
# Parent: Rel. Service <1/Month 16525 0.238 0.238 0.426 0.426 0.000 1.000
# Parent: Rel. Service Never 16525 0.127 0.136 0.333 0.342 0.000 1.000
No Religion 16522 0.063 0.069 0.242 0.253 0.000 1.000
Parent: Rel. Important 16522 0.889 0.880 0.314 0.325 0.000 1.000
Parent: Rel. Not Important 16522 0.048 0.051 0.214 0.221 0.000 1.000
Physical Condition
BMI: Underweight 19263 0.134 0.150 0.341 0.357 0.000 1.000
BMI: Normal Weight 19263 0.630 0.614 0.483 0.487 0.000 1.000
BMI: Overweight 19263 0.235 0.236 0.424 0.425 0.000 1.000
Looks: Very Unattractive 19246 0.018 0.018 0.132 0.131 0.000 1.000
Looks: Unattractive 19246 0.046 0.045 0.210 0.207 0.000 1.000
Looks: Avrg. Attractive 19246 0.446 0.444 0.497 0.497 0.000 1.000
Looks: Attractive 19246 0.340 0.341 0.474 0.474 0.000 1.000
Looks: Very Attractive 19246 0.151 0.153 0.358 0.360 0.000 1.000
Health: Excellent 19258 0.280 0.282 0.449 0.450 0.000 1.000
Health: Very Good 19258 0.393 0.396 0.488 0.489 0.000 1.000
Health: Good 19258 0.256 0.254 0.436 0.435 0.000 1.000
Health: Not Good 19258 0.070 0.068 0.256 0.251 0.000 1.000
Permanent Physical Condition? 19253 0.028 0.023 0.165 0.151 0.000 1.000
Use Mobility Device? 19255 0.030 0.028 0.171 0.165 0.000 1.000
Physical Diﬃculties? 19257 0.048 0.042 0.213 0.200 0.000 1.000
Psychological Condition
Intelligence? Below Avrg. 19244 0.063 0.068 0.243 0.252 0.000 1.000
Intelligence? About Avrg. 19244 0.394 0.378 0.489 0.485 0.000 1.000
Intelligence? Above Avrg. 19244 0.543 0.554 0.498 0.497 0.000 1.000
Hard Work Pays? Agree 19237 0.737 0.733 0.440 0.442 0.000 1.000
Hard Work Pays? Don't Know 19237 0.184 0.187 0.388 0.390 0.000 1.000
Hard Work Pays? Disagree 19237 0.079 0.080 0.270 0.271 0.000 1.000
# No Suicidal Thoughts 19259 0.869 0.871 0.338 0.336 0.000 1.000
# Suicide Attempts: 0 19259 0.092 0.092 0.289 0.288 0.000 1.000
# Suicide Attempts: 1 19259 0.024 0.025 0.153 0.156 0.000 1.000
# Suicide Attempts: >1 19259 0.015 0.013 0.123 0.114 0.000 1.000
Going to College? No/Little Chance 19211 0.099 0.099 0.299 0.298 0.000 1.000
Going to College? 50:50 Chance 19211 0.147 0.145 0.355 0.352 0.000 1.000
Going to College? Good Chance 19211 0.218 0.211 0.413 0.408 0.000 1.000
Going to College? Almost Certain 19211 0.536 0.545 0.499 0.498 0.000 1.000
Live to 35? No/Little Chance 19204 0.038 0.033 0.191 0.179 0.000 1.000
Live to 35? 50:50 Chance 19204 0.113 0.104 0.317 0.306 0.000 1.000
Live to 35? Good Chance 19204 0.305 0.284 0.460 0.451 0.000 1.000
Live to 35? Almost Certain 19204 0.544 0.578 0.498 0.494 0.000 1.000
Marry 'til 25? No/Little Chance 19206 0.233 0.223 0.423 0.416 0.000 1.000
Marry 'til 25? 50:50 Chance 19206 0.349 0.344 0.477 0.475 0.000 1.000
Marry 'til 25? Good Chance 19206 0.292 0.306 0.455 0.461 0.000 1.000
Marry 'til 25? Almost Certain 19206 0.125 0.126 0.331 0.332 0.000 1.000
Psychological Counseling 19249 0.125 0.125 0.331 0.331 0.000 1.000
Risk Behavior
Continued on next page
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Table 10  Continued from previous page
N Mean Mean
(Weighted)
SD SD
(Weighted)
Min Max
Never Smoked 19250 0.577 0.559 0.494 0.497 0.000 1.000
Not Smoked Regularly 19250 0.230 0.236 0.421 0.425 0.000 1.000
Smoked Regularly 19250 0.193 0.205 0.395 0.404 0.000 1.000
Never Drink 19244 0.541 0.543 0.498 0.498 0.000 1.000
Drink: 1-7/Week 19244 0.093 0.089 0.290 0.285 0.000 1.000
Drink: <1-3/Month 19244 0.197 0.199 0.398 0.399 0.000 1.000
Drink: 1-2/Year 19244 0.169 0.168 0.375 0.374 0.000 1.000
No Smoking Friends 19121 0.549 0.547 0.498 0.498 0.000 1.000
# Smoking Friends: 1 19121 0.205 0.205 0.403 0.404 0.000 1.000
# Smoking Friends: 2 19121 0.128 0.125 0.334 0.330 0.000 1.000
# Smoking Friends: 3 19121 0.119 0.123 0.324 0.328 0.000 1.000
No Drinking Friends 19103 0.445 0.456 0.497 0.498 0.000 1.000
# Drinking Friends: 1 19103 0.211 0.206 0.408 0.404 0.000 1.000
# Drinking Friends: 2 19103 0.154 0.148 0.361 0.355 0.000 1.000
# Drinking Friends: 3 19103 0.191 0.190 0.393 0.393 0.000 1.000
No Weed Smoking Friends 19078 0.652 0.671 0.476 0.470 0.000 1.000
# Weed Smoking Friends: 1 19078 0.156 0.150 0.363 0.357 0.000 1.000
# Weed Smoking Friends: 2 19078 0.095 0.090 0.293 0.286 0.000 1.000
# Weed Smoking Friends: 3 19078 0.097 0.089 0.296 0.285 0.000 1.000
Ever Smoked Weed 19263 0.290 0.274 0.454 0.446 0.000 1.000
Ever Used Cocaine 19263 0.046 0.044 0.209 0.205 0.000 1.000
Ever Used Inhalants 19263 0.074 0.075 0.261 0.263 0.000 1.000
Ever Used Other Drugs 19263 0.092 0.090 0.289 0.287 0.000 1.000
Genetic Endowment
DAT1 A: >9R 13802 0.598 0.580 0.490 0.494 0.000 1.000
DAT1 A: 3R-9R 13802 0.402 0.420 0.490 0.494 0.000 1.000
DAT1 B: >9R 13802 0.943 0.940 0.233 0.237 0.000 1.000
DAT1 B: 7R-9R 13802 0.057 0.060 0.233 0.237 0.000 1.000
DRD4 A: 2R-3.39R 13815 0.219 0.224 0.413 0.417 0.000 1.000
DRD4 A: 4R-6R 13815 0.731 0.726 0.443 0.446 0.000 1.000
DRD4 A: >6R 13815 0.050 0.050 0.218 0.218 0.000 1.000
DRD4 B: 2R-3R 13815 0.018 0.018 0.134 0.133 0.000 1.000
DRD4 B: 4R-6R 13815 0.605 0.603 0.489 0.489 0.000 1.000
DRD4 B: >6R 13815 0.377 0.379 0.485 0.485 0.000 1.000
MAOA_V A: 2R-3.5R 13825 0.541 0.516 0.498 0.500 0.000 1.000
MAOA_V A: 4R-5R 13825 0.459 0.484 0.498 0.500 0.000 1.000
MAOA_V B: 2R-3.5R 13825 0.092 0.079 0.289 0.270 0.000 1.000
MAOA_V B: 4R-5R 13825 0.446 0.435 0.497 0.496 0.000 1.000
MAOA_V B: Male 13825 0.462 0.485 0.499 0.500 0.000 1.000
HTTLPR A: L' 13838 0.336 0.320 0.472 0.466 0.000 1.000
HTTLPR A: S' 13838 0.664 0.680 0.472 0.466 0.000 1.000
HTTLPR B: L' 13838 0.619 0.634 0.486 0.482 0.000 1.000
HTTLPR B: S' 13838 0.381 0.366 0.486 0.482 0.000 1.000
DRD2 A: A 13693 0.452 0.443 0.498 0.497 0.000 1.000
DRD2 A: G 13693 0.548 0.557 0.498 0.497 0.000 1.000
DRD2 B: A 13693 0.074 0.062 0.262 0.242 0.000 1.000
DRD2 B: G 13693 0.926 0.938 0.262 0.242 0.000 1.000
COMT A: A 13174 0.683 0.711 0.465 0.454 0.000 1.000
COMT A: G 13174 0.317 0.289 0.465 0.454 0.000 1.000
COMT B: A 13174 0.206 0.227 0.404 0.419 0.000 1.000
COMT B: G 13174 0.794 0.773 0.404 0.419 0.000 1.000
5HTT A: C 12872 0.920 0.921 0.271 0.270 0.000 1.000
5HTT A: T 12872 0.080 0.079 0.271 0.270 0.000 1.000
5HTT B: C 12872 0.521 0.504 0.500 0.500 0.000 1.000
5HTT B: T 12872 0.479 0.496 0.500 0.500 0.000 1.000
DRD5 A: 124-132 13525 0.029 0.022 0.169 0.147 0.000 1.000
DRD5 A: 134 13525 0.026 0.029 0.158 0.168 0.000 1.000
DRD5 A: 136 13525 0.042 0.041 0.200 0.198 0.000 1.000
DRD5 A: 138 13525 0.133 0.140 0.340 0.347 0.000 1.000
DRD5 A: 140 13525 0.081 0.081 0.273 0.273 0.000 1.000
DRD5 A: 142 13525 0.090 0.080 0.286 0.271 0.000 1.000
DRD5 A: 144 13525 0.084 0.073 0.278 0.260 0.000 1.000
DRD5 A: 146 13525 0.115 0.109 0.319 0.311 0.000 1.000
DRD5 A: 148 13525 0.332 0.360 0.471 0.480 0.000 1.000
DRD5 A: 150-172 13525 0.067 0.065 0.250 0.246 0.000 1.000
DRD5 B: 126-138 13525 0.022 0.021 0.145 0.144 0.000 1.000
DRD5 B: 140 13525 0.014 0.014 0.120 0.116 0.000 1.000
DRD5 B: 142 13525 0.029 0.027 0.168 0.162 0.000 1.000
DRD5 B: 144 13525 0.039 0.034 0.194 0.181 0.000 1.000
DRD5 B: 146 13525 0.072 0.063 0.258 0.243 0.000 1.000
DRD5 B: 148 13525 0.429 0.433 0.495 0.496 0.000 1.000
DRD5 B: 150 13525 0.181 0.190 0.385 0.392 0.000 1.000
DRD5 B: 152 13525 0.139 0.142 0.346 0.349 0.000 1.000
DRD5 B: 154 13525 0.043 0.050 0.204 0.218 0.000 1.000
DRD5 B: 156-174 13525 0.032 0.026 0.175 0.159 0.000 1.000
MAOCA1 A: 101-113 13574 0.030 0.020 0.172 0.140 0.000 1.000
MAOCA1 A: 109 13574 0.015 0.010 0.120 0.101 0.000 1.000
MAOCA1 A: 111 13574 0.070 0.073 0.255 0.261 0.000 1.000
MAOCA1 A: 113 13574 0.515 0.537 0.500 0.499 0.000 1.000
MAOCA1 A: 115 13574 0.164 0.156 0.371 0.363 0.000 1.000
MAOCA1 A: 117 13574 0.025 0.023 0.156 0.149 0.000 1.000
MAOCA1 A: 119-131 13574 0.182 0.180 0.386 0.384 0.000 1.000
MAOCA1 B: 103-113 13574 0.139 0.143 0.346 0.350 0.000 1.000
MAOCA1 B: 115 13574 0.111 0.105 0.314 0.306 0.000 1.000
MAOCA1 B: 117-119 13574 0.043 0.039 0.204 0.195 0.000 1.000
MAOCA1 B: 121 13574 0.170 0.160 0.376 0.367 0.000 1.000
MAOCA1 B: 123 13574 0.016 0.012 0.124 0.110 0.000 1.000
MAOCA1 B: 125 13574 0.044 0.046 0.204 0.210 0.000 1.000
MAOCA1 B: 127-131 13574 0.018 0.013 0.133 0.113 0.000 1.000
MAOCA1 B: Male 13574 0.460 0.482 0.498 0.500 0.000 1.000
Note: In the weighted columns summary statistics are corrected for sampling procedure and sample attrition until Wave 3.
A.2 Shapley Value Decomposition
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Table 11: Shapley Value Decomposition
Outcome Diss. Index Ωm Contrib. in %
Registered (2000) 9.5% Family 2.0pp 21.0%
Psychological Condition 1.5pp 16.0%
Demographics 1.2pp 12.5%
Neighborhood 1.1pp 11.1%
Religion 0.7pp 7.7%
Genetic Endowment 0.7pp 7.3%
Risk Behavior 0.6pp 6.7%
Social Life 0.6pp 6.3%
Physical Condition 0.5pp 4.8%
School 0.4pp 3.8%
Ability 0.3pp 2.8%
Vote (2000) 19.8% Family 4.0pp 20.3%
Psychological Condition 3.5pp 17.7%
Risk Behavior 2.0pp 10.1%
Demographics 1.9pp 9.6%
Religion 1.9pp 9.6%
Neighborhood 1.7pp 8.8%
Genetic Endowment 1.2pp 6.1%
School 1.0pp 5.1%
Physical Condition 1.0pp 4.9%
Ability 0.8pp 4.1%
Social Life 0.7pp 3.6%
Contact Oﬃcial 59.7% Family 13.7pp 23.0%
Psychological Condition 10.4pp 17.4%
Genetic Endowment 7.5pp 12.5%
Neighborhood 6.1pp 10.2%
Risk Behavior 4.7pp 7.9%
Demographics 3.5pp 5.9%
Physical Condition 3.4pp 5.7%
Social Life 3.2pp 5.4%
School 3.0pp 5.1%
Religion 2.6pp 4.3%
Ability 1.6pp 2.6%
Rally/March 55.4% Family 13.0pp 23.5%
Psychological Condition 8.3pp 14.9%
Genetic Endowment 6.7pp 12.2%
Neighborhood 6.1pp 11.0%
Risk Behavior 5.9pp 10.6%
Physical Condition 3.8pp 7.0%
Social Life 3.8pp 6.9%
Religion 2.9pp 5.3%
Ability 2.1pp 3.9%
School 1.5pp 2.6%
Demographics 1.3pp 2.3%
Political Organization 63.0% Family 11.5pp 18.3%
Psychological Condition 11.2pp 17.8%
Genetic Endowment 7.7pp 12.3%
Neighborhood 7.0pp 11.2%
Risk Behavior 6.2pp 9.8%
School 4.4pp 7.0%
Social Life 4.2pp 6.6%
Physical Condition 4.1pp 6.5%
Demographics 3.7pp 5.9%
Ability 1.5pp 2.4%
Religion 1.4pp 2.2%
Volunteer Work 24.0% Family 4.7pp 19.8%
Psychological Condition 4.2pp 17.4%
Risk Behavior 3.0pp 12.5%
Neighborhood 2.2pp 9.1%
Religion 2.1pp 8.8%
Social Life 1.9pp 8.0%
Genetic Endowment 1.4pp 6.0%
Physical Condition 1.4pp 6.0%
Demographics 1.3pp 5.5%
School 0.9pp 3.6%
Ability 0.8pp 3.4%
Vote Always 22.4% Family 4.2pp 18.6%
Psychological Condition 3.6pp 16.0%
Neighborhood 3.3pp 14.9%
Genetic Endowment 2.9pp 12.8%
Demographics 2.0pp 8.8%
Risk Behavior 1.5pp 6.7%
Physical Condition 1.3pp 5.8%
Social Life 1.3pp 5.6%
Religion 1.0pp 4.6%
School 0.9pp 3.8%
Ability 0.5pp 2.3%
Vote Never 24.5% Family 5.4pp 22.2%
Psychological Condition 4.5pp 18.3%
Demographics 2.2pp 9.1%
Neighborhood 2.1pp 8.7%
Risk Behavior 1.9pp 7.9%
Religion 1.9pp 7.8%
Genetic Endowment 1.8pp 7.5%
Ability 1.3pp 5.5%
Social Life 1.3pp 5.1%
Physical Condition 1.1pp 4.5%
School 0.9pp 3.5%
Note: The Shapley decompositions in this table are based on the results from the logit
estimator. The last two columns indicate the Shapley value contribution of the respective
circumstance set.
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A.3 Gelbach Decomposition
The decomposition is implemented as follows. We propose a set of eﬀort variables Θ and
estimate a restricted model with Θ as the only right-hand side variables in order to obtain
βl for each eﬀort E
l ∈ Θ:
pi = β0 +
L∑
l=1
βlE
l
i + ui. (6)
In a second step we estimate the unrestricted model including all eﬀort variables and all
circumstance variables as deﬁned by the eleven circumstance groups Ωm. Without a claim
to causality, for each eﬀort El we obtain the coeﬃcient βΩl , which is indicative of the impact
of eﬀort net of circumstance inﬂuence. Furthermore, we obtain βj , i.e. the impact of each
circumstance on the outcome of interest:
pi = β0 +
L∑
l=1
βΩl E
l
i +
J∑
j=1
βjC
j
i + u
Ω
i . (7)
Note that it is precisely the term βl−βΩl = ∆ =
∑
m ∆
m, that we want to decompose into
the contributions of each circumstance group Ωm.
In a third step we regress each circumstance variable Cj on the set of eﬀort variables
Θ:
Cji = β0 +
L∑
l=1
γjl E
l
i + vi. (8)
As a result we obtain γjl for each eﬀort variable. As demonstrated by Gelbach (2016),
the product βj ∗ γjl now yields ∆j , i.e. the share of eﬀort inﬂuence that is attributable to
circumstance Cj . Summing over all Cj ∈ Ωm, then yields ∆m, the composite inﬂuence of
the circumstance group of interest.
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